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JENNINGS V. STEPHENS AND
JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY IN HABEAS
APPEALS
*

ERIC O’BRIEN
INTRODUCTION

The writ of habeas corpus was once seen as the great protector of
1
the people against the overwhelming power of the State; now its
2
reputation has shrunk to little more than a stall tactic. As Congress
and the courts have increasingly disfavored the “Great Writ,” its
3
power to grant relief has nearly evaporated. Although some of the
writ’s recent diminishment was necessary to keep judicial proceedings
4
from dragging on too long, some commenters believe that the writ’s
power has been curtailed too much, and that it is no longer an
5
effective enough tool for those in need of its protection. As the courts
continue to stake out the borders of habeas procedure, some
jurisdictions have continued to impose even greater restrictions on
habeas petitioners, such as requiring successful petitioners to file
unnecessary motions and cross-appeals to fully defend their
judgments. These courts have overstepped, however, and the Supreme
Court has before it a chance to stop the erosion of the writ’s power.

* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2016, Duke University School of Law.
1. See Lynn Adelman, Federal Habeas Review of State Court Convictions: Incoherent Law
but an Essential Right, 64 ME. L. REV. 379, 380–81 (2012) (noting that habeas corpus has long
been known “the Great Writ of Liberty”).
2. See Larry Yackle, AEDPA Mea Culpa, 24 FED. SENT’G. REP. 329, 330 (noting that
many have concluded that prisoners file habeas petitions solely to delay execution of capital
sentences).
3. Id. at 384–85 (noting that habeas petitions are granted so infrequently that some have
argued the writ is no longer needed in non-capital cases).
4. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, & Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Noncapital
Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435, 441–42 (2011) (compiling
recent changes in habeas law and noting Congress’s intention for these changes to shorten
judicial proceedings).
5. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 1, at 384.
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The question presented in Jennings v. Stephens is whether a
habeas petitioner, after winning at the district court on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, needs to file a cross-appeal and a
motion for a certificate of appealability for the circuit court of appeals
to consider an additional argument supporting that ineffective
assistance claim, even though the district court rejected that
7
additional argument. This question has received mixed answers from
the federal circuit courts. The Supreme Court should rule in favor of
the petitioner, Jennings, because by prevailing at the district court
level, habeas petitioners have shown the merit of their claims. Forcing
habeas petitioners to present motions and briefs, which no longer
serve their gate-keeping functions, only hinders judicial efficiency.
This case also presents the Court with an opportunity to weigh in
on another deep circuit split over whether an attorney’s errors can be
considered cumulatively in ineffective assistance of counsel cases. This
is an important question because repeated errors by counsel can
sometimes be just as harmful as one egregious error, and can just as
easily deny a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to effective
8
assistance counsel. The Court should therefore rule in favor of the
habeas petitioner on this issue as well, as the petitioner’s stance has
the better policy rationale and brings greater uniformity to habeas
law.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 19, 1988, Robert Jennings shot and killed Officer Elston
Howard of the Houston Police Department during a botched robbery
attempt at a local adult bookstore. Jennings was tried for capital
9
murder and found guilty by the jury after one hour of deliberation.
During the penalty phase, the State sought the death penalty and
10
presented evidence of Jennings’s extensive criminal history.
6. Jennings v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x 326 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. granted in part, 134 S. Ct.
1539 (2014).
7. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 37, Jennings v. Stephens, No. 13-7211 (U.S. Oct. 28,
2013), 2013 WL 8116856, at *37.
8. See Michael C. McLaughlin, It Adds Up: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the
Cumulative Deficiency Doctrine, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 879 (2014) (calling for the Supreme
Court to take up the issue of the theory of cumulative prejudice at its first opportunity).
9. Brief for the Respondent, Jennings v. Stephens at 2, No. 13-7211 (U.S. Aug. 12, 2014),
2014 WL 3945237, at *2.
10. The prosecution introduced evidence that Jennings had been declared a delinquent
and placed on probation when he was fourteen and was sent to a trade school as a condition of
his probation at fifteen. Jennings, 537 F. App’x at 328. At age sixteen, Jennings was sent to a
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Jennings’s trial counsel hoped to mitigate the sentence by having
Jennings testify about his troubled upbringing—he had been
conceived as the result of rape, grew up in poverty with no father
figure, and was raised by a drug-addicted mother who resented him
11
for being born and disrupting her education. Jennings’s counsel also
requested that Jennings be allowed to testify without being subject to
cross-examination, but the trial court denied this request, and
12
Jennings did not testify.
Jennings’s counsel subsequently presented only one witness
during sentencing: George Burrell, a chaplain in the Harris County
13
Sherriff’s Office. Burrell testified that he had met Jennings shortly
after his most recent arrest. Based on his multiple visits each week,
Burrell testified that he did not think that Jennings was
14
“incorrigible.” Burrell was also unaware of any disciplinary
violations committed by Jennings during his time in jail and felt that
15
Jennings had “changed” since their first meeting. He further testified
that Jennings was an asset to his ministry, and that Jennings helped
16
provide support to other inmates.
No other mitigating evidence was presented in Jennings’s
17
defense. In his closing argument, Jennings’s attorney said, “I feel like
I ought to just sit down. Shoot, you twelve people know what the
evidence is. You’ve heard it. You’ve probably already decided what
18
you’re going to do with Jennings in this case.” He urged the jurors to
consider all of the facts and to refrain from voting too quickly for
19
death. He stated that because he lived and worked in the same
county as the jurors and cared about the safety of the community, he

juvenile facility for a probation violation, and at seventeen, he was convicted of aggravated
robbery and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. Id. Then, at twenty, he was convicted of
burglarizing a home and two more aggravated robberies (this time, he was sentenced to two
concurrent thirty-year sentences, and while serving that sentence, he committed thirteen prison
disciplinary violations); and within two months of his release, he committed six aggravated
robberies and killed Officer Howard. Id.
11. Jennings v. Thaler, No. H–09–219, 2012 WL 1440387, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2012).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Jennings, 537 F. App’x at 328.
15. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at *3.
16. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *2.
17. Jennings, 537 F. App’x at 328.
18. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Jennings v. Stephens, No. 13-721 (U.S. June 6, 2014) 2014
WL 2601476, at *4.
19. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *2–3.
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could not “quarrel with” a decision to put Jennings to death, but said,
21
“[I]f you can, I ask you to find . . . mitigation.” The jury, however,
22
found no mitigating factors and Jennings was sentenced to death.
Jennings appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which
23
affirmed his death sentence in an unpublished decision. He next
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but the Court denied
24
certiorari. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently denied
his state habeas corpus application in 2008, and his petition for
25
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was again denied.
In 2009 Jennings filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the
26
Southern District ofTexas. In his petition, Jennings asserted that he
had received ineffective assistance of counsel during his sentencing
27
hearing. He argued that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to
call Jennings, his sister, or his mother, for failing to find and present
any evidence of Jennings’s mental health issues, and for offering a
28
closing argument that was prejudicial to Jennings. The district court
found that, although there were definite risks involved in calling
29
Jennings or his mother to the stand, counsel’s reasons for not calling
Jennings’s sister “made no sense,” and that refusing to call any
30
member of the Jennings family “was not sound trial strategy.” In
reaching its decision that counsel was deficient, the court pointed to
31
Wiggins v. Smith, which it said “makes clear that failure to present
available significant mitigating evidence resulting in the virtual
32
absence of a mitigation case is deficient performance.”

20. Jennings v. Thaler, No. H–09–219, 2012 WL 1440387, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2012).
21. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *3.
22. Jennings, 2012 WL 1440387, at *3.
23. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *4.
24. Jennings v. Texas, 510 U.S. 830, 830 (1993).
25. Jennings, 2012 WL 1440387, at *1.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *3.
28. Id. at *3–6.
29. Counsel stated that he did not think Jennings’s sister, who was ten when Jennings
entered the juvenile justice system, was old enough to remember pertinent events. Id. at *4.
30. Id. Moreover, “[w]hatever damage counsel may have feared from cross examination of
Jennings or Mrs. Jennings’s hostility toward her son is far outweighed by the damage caused by
presenting no evidence at all of Jennings’s background, i.e., giving the jury no reason not to
impose a death sentence.” Id. (emphasis in original).
31. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
32. Jennings, 2012 WL 1440387, at *4.
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The district court also found that Jennings’s counsel was deficient
33
for failing to find and present evidence of Jennings’s mental health.
A prior psychological evaluation performed on Jennings to determine
his competence to stand trial revealed that he had an IQ of 65 and
34
mild organic brain dysfunction as the result of a childhood injury.
However, the evaluation also noted that Jennings was “malingering”
35
during his evaluation in order to appear incompetent to stand trial.
The district court found the state court’s determination that counsel
was not deficient for failing to present this evidence to be
unreasonable. The state court had considered the report unreliable
because Jennings was malingering during his examination, but the
district court noted that the report acknowledged Jennings’s
malingering but still concluded he had mild organic brain
36
dysfunction.
The federal district court was not persuaded, however, that the
37
closing argument constituted deficient performance. The court
determined that Jennings’s counsel was attempting to identify with
the jurors while still convincing them that a death sentence was
inappropriate, and therefore found that the state court was reasonable
in determining that the closing argument did not constitute deficient
38
performance.
Finally, the court held that the deficiencies of Jennings’s counsel
39
prejudiced him during the sentencing phase. The court dismissed the
State’s motion for summary judgment and granted Jennings’s habeas
40
petition. The State was ordered to release Jennings from custody
unless it granted Jennings a new sentencing hearing or resentenced
41
him to a term of imprisonment within 120 days.
The State appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the district
42
court. The Fifth Circuit found that Jennings was not prejudiced by
his counsel’s failure to present testimony of his disadvantaged
background or to investigate and present evidence of his mental

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *6–7.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Jennings v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x 326, 339 (5th Cir. 2013).
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health. The court also held that Jennings was barred from arguing
that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at closing argument
because Jennings had not filed a notice of appeal, had failed to seek a
certificate of appealability from the district court, and had not filed a
motion for a certificate of appealability with the circuit court until
44
well after the appeal had already been briefed. The court denied his
motion for a certificate of appealability, dismissed his “cross-point” of
counsel’s ineffective closing argument, and reversed the district
45
court’s judgment granting habeas relief on the merits.
In response to the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, Jennings filed a petition
46
for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. He
claimed, inter alia, that the Fifth Circuit erred by holding: (1) that
Jennings’s counsel’s failure to present evidence of Jennings’s
47
background was not deficient; (2) that his counsel’s failure to present
48
evidence of his mental impairment was not prejudicial; and (3) “that
a federal habeas petitioner who prevailed in the district court on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim must file a separate notice of
appeal and motion for a certificate of appealability to raise an
49
allegation of deficient performance that the district court rejected.”
The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of
whether Jennings needed to file a cross-appeal and a motion for a
certificate of appealability after being granted his habeas petition in
50
federal district court.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. AEDPA and the Tightening of Habeas Corpus Standards
In 1996 Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
51
Penalty Act (AEDPA) with the purpose of streamlining habeas
52
corpus cases. The Supreme Court, which had been putting

43. Id. at 334–35.
44. Id. at 338.
45. Id.
46. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at *1.
47. Id. at *6.
48. Id. at *7.
49. Id. at *11.
50. Jennings v. Stephens, 134 S. Ct. 1539 (2014).
51. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A.).
52. Brooke N. Wallace, Uniform Application of Habeas Corpus Jurisprudence: The
Trouble with Applying Section 2244's Statute of Limitations Period, 79 TEMPLE L. REV. 703, 703
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restrictions on habeas review in the years immediately preceding the
bill, interpreted the AEDPA’s purpose to be “further[ing] the
53
principles of comity, finality, and federalism.” The bill was promoted
as a way to reduce the number of successful death penalty challenges
54
and to reduce the delay from those proceedings. Further, the bill
sought to curtail the reach of the federal courts into state court
55
proceedings.
The bill enabled these ends by heightening the standards for
56
relief. AEDPA speaks specifically to federal court review of state
57
court decisions in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This section requires a federal
court to determine that the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
58
presented in the state court proceeding.” This constraint requires the
federal court to give great deference to the state court’s ruling, and
59
does not require the state court to be correct, but only “reasonable.”
This in turn has served to lessen the effectiveness of the federal
habeas petition by making it more difficult for petitioners to
overcome the state court’s ruling.
B. Habeas Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Supreme Court has taken the restrictive standards of AEDPA
and extended them even further for habeas claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The current standard for ineffective assistance
was set pre-AEDPA in 1984 by the Court’s holding in Strickland v.
60
Washington. In Strickland, the Court laid out the two prongs of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim: (1) “counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment”; and (2) “the deficient
(2006). For a comparison of pre- and post-AEDPA habeas law. see Larry W. Yackle, A Primer
on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 381 (1996),
53. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,
436 (2000)).
54. Adelman, supra note 1, at 384.
55. Yackle, supra note 52, at 329–30.
56. Adelman, supra note 1, at 384.
57. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783 (2011).
58. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2014).
59. Adelman, supra note 1, at 384.
60. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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performance prejudiced the defense.” To satisfy the prejudice prong
of the claim, the Court required the errors to be “so serious as to
62
deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” In death penalty sentencing,
“the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent
the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of
63
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”
Though the Court did not specifically define what constitutes a
“reasonable probability,” they gave some guidance by stating that the
probability must be “sufficient to undermine the confidence of the
64
result.”
AEDPA heightened the standard under which all federal habeas
cases are reviewed even further. Under AEDPA, a federal court
deciding a habeas claim “must determine what arguments or theories
supported or . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and
then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could
disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the
65
holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” The standard for
ineffective assistance in habeas is thus “doubly deferential” to the
66
state court.
Though the Supreme Court has “declined to articulate specific
67
guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct,” it has provided several
examples of attorney performances that do not satisfy the highly
deferential standards. In Williams v. Taylor, the Court held that
counsel’s failure to search for records describing the petitioner’s
“nightmarish childhood,” because counsel mistakenly thought access
to the records was barred by state law, constituted deficient
68
performance. Additionally in Wiggins v. Smith, the Court concluded
that the attorney’s performance fell below the deferential standard
for ineffective assistance where counsel, in a death penalty case, failed
to investigate beyond the presentence report and social services
69
record for mitigating factors.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 694.
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 112 (2009).
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003).
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000).
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
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The federal circuits are split on several issues related to
determining the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel. First,
the circuits differ on whether each instance of deficient performance
should be considered individually or cumulatively when determining
whether the petitioner was prejudiced under the second prong of
70
Strickland. The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have
71
rejected the theory that deficiency can be cumulated, while the
72
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have accepted the theory. The
Eleventh Circuit recently noted the lack of Supreme Court precedent
on this topic, and deferred to a state court’s decision rather than take
73
a position. Not surprisingly, the circuit courts are also split the same
way over whether multiple instances of deficiency are part of one
unitary ineffective assistance claim or if they are each their own
74
individual claim.
C. Cross-appeals and Certificates of Appealability
Petitioners whose habeas petitions are denied at the district court
level are required to do two things before they can have their cases
75
heard by the circuit court: (1) file a timely notice of appeal; and (2)
76
obtain a certificate of appealability. While filing a notice of appeal is

70. See generally McLaughlin, supra note 8.
71. See, e.g., Sutton v. Bell, 645 F.3d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 2011); Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d
835, 852 (4th Cir. 1998); Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996); Jones v.
Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 147 (10th Cir. 1995).
72. See, e.g., Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995); Williams
v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1995); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir.
1991).
73. See Forrest v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 342 F. App’x 560, 564–65 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the applicability of the cumulative error doctrine in
the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”).
74. See, e.g., Fisher, 163 F.3d at 852 (“To the extent this Court has not specifically stated
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims . . . must be reviewed individually, rather than
collectively, we do so now.”); United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting the theory that “an ineffectiveness claim may be viewed as unitary, regardless of the
number of separate reasons advanced in support of the claim”); but see Peoples v. United States,
403 F.3d 844, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that ineffectiveness is a single claim); Babbitt v.
Woodford, 177 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that two deficiencies constituted the same
ineffective assistance claim).
75. FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1) (“An appeal permitted by law as of right from a district court
to a court of appeals may be taken only by filing a notice of appeal with the district clerk within
the time allowed by Rule 4.”).
76. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (West 2014) (“Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . [t]he
final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of
process issued by a State court[.]”).
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guaranteed as an option by law, a motion for a certificate of
appealability may be granted “only if the applicant has made a
78
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” The
motion also must indicate “which specific issue or issues” satisfy that
79
substantial showing requirement. These stringent requirements for
the issuance of a certificate of appealability do not apply when the
80
State takes the appeal itself.
The Supreme Court held in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie
that in civil cases, a party who prevailed in the district court must file
a cross-appeal when seeking an expanded judgment in their favor,
81
beyond what the district court granted them. However, the Court
held in United States v. American Railway Express Co. that a crossappeal is not required in civil cases for an appellee to add extra
arguments on appeal to support his favorable judgment below, even if
those arguments “attack” the reasoning the lower court used to reach
82
that result.
With respect to certificates of appealability in habeas cases, the
federal circuits are split on whether § 2253 applies to petitioners who
are granted relief in district court and subsequently requires them to
acquire a certificate of appealability before advancing an argument
83
not adopted by the district court. The Seventh Circuit has held that
habeas petitioners do not need a certificate of appealability after
being granted relief in the distrct court, determining that § 2253 “deals
only with appeals by prisoners; it does not mention arguments by
prisoners as appellees offered in support of relief they have
84
obtained.” However, the Fifth and Second Circuits have each held
that § 2253 does apply to habeas petitioners as appellees, and have
required a certificate of appealability when raising alternate grounds
85
for relief even after the relief was ultimately obtained below.
77. FED. R. APP. P. (3)(a)(1).
78. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(2) (West 2014).
79. Id. at § 2253(c)(3).
80. FED. R. APP. P. 22(b)(3) (“A certificate of appealability is not required when a state or
its representative or the United States or its representative appeals.”).
81. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 473 (1999).
82. United States v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435–36 (1924).
83. Jennings v. Stephens, 537 F. App’x 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2013).
84. Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir. 2002).
85. See Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199, 204 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that petitioner failed to
seek a certificate of appealability for an alternate ground and rejecting the ground as a result);
Grotto v. Herbert, 316 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A] habeas petitioner to whom the writ has
been granted on one or more grounds may not assert, in opposition to an appeal by the state,
any ground that the district court has not adopted unless the petitioner obtains a certificate of
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III. ARGUMENTS
A. Arguments for Jennings
Jennings advances two alternate reasons for reversing the Fifth
Circuit. He first argues that a habeas petitioner who was granted
relief in the district court should not be required to cross-appeal or
file a motion for a certificate of appealability if he is not seeking to
86
expand his relief. Alternatively, he argues that even if a certificate of
appealability and a cross-appeal are required to raise a different claim
from the one the petitioner prevailed on below, neither were required
here because Jennings was only asserting an additional ground for
deficient performance—not an additional claim—because ineffective
assistance should be considered a single claim regardless of the
87
number of instances of deficient performance by counsel.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure state that an appeal
88
“may be taken” by filing timely notice of appeal. Jennings argues
that this does not apply to him because he was not taking an appeal—
89
the State was. He further contends that the cross-appeal rules from
the civil cases, American Railway and Neztsosie, are applicable to
habeas cases as well and only requires a cross-appeal when the
petitioner seeks to enlarge the judgment in his favor by requesting
additional relief, such as when a party is granted some injunctions and
denied others in district court, but seeks to have all those injunctions
90
granted on appeal. Because Jennings was granted all the relief he
requested—a new sentencing hearing—raising arguments that the
91
district court rejected would not enlarge his relief. He supplements
92
his point with the policy argument advanced by now-Chief Judge
Easterbrook in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., that cross-appeals solely
for advancing an argument in support of the judgment are
unnecessary and waste judicial resources by adding to the number of
93
briefs, thereby delaying the case.

appealability permitting him to argue that ground.”).
86. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *7.
87. Id. at 8.
88. FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1).
89. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *9.
90. Id. at *12–14.
91. Id. at *16–17.
92. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *17.
93. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 439 (7th Cir. 1987).
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Jennings also argues that he was not required to file a motion for a
certificate of appealabilty in order to raise an alternate ground for
94
affirmance. He again points to the text of the relevant statute, § 2253,
emphasizing that “an appeal may not be taken” without a certificate
of appealability. Because the State “took” the appeal, Jennings
maintains that the statute does not require him to request a certificate
95
of appealability. He argues that allowing alternate arguments
without the certificate would not waste judicial resources because
habeas petitioners who have won below have already established that
96
their claims are not “frivolous.” Also, winning below gives habeas
petitioners an incentive to advance only their best arguments because
97
they now have a judgment in their favor to zealously defend.
Jennings alternatively argues that even if a habeas petitioner is
required to obtain a certificate of appealability on a claim distinct
from the claim he prevailed on, Jennings is only advancing an
additional argument for his single ineffective assistance claim and is
98
not raising a separate claim here. He argues that Strickland requires
courts to weigh the cumulative effect of each act of deficient
performance, and points to the Court’s use of the plural “errors” in its
99
decision. He also argues the Strickland Court established that
prejudice analysis for habeas is similar to the materiality analysis for
100
suppression of evidence under United States v. Agurs. Just as a
materiality analysis requires considering the cumulative effect of all
101
evidence suppressed, so should a prejudice analysis consider all
instances of deficient performance.
In a final alternative argument, Jennings states that if all other
arguments fail, the Fifth Circuit still had jurisdiction to grant a
certificate of appealability because an appellee’s failure to request a
certificate of appealability is not jurisdictional, even if an appellant’s
102
failure is. Pursuant to this last argument, Jennings requests the case
94. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *18.
95. Id. at *19.
96. Id. at *22.
97. Petitioner’s Reply Brief, Jennings v. Stephens, No. 13-7211 (U.S. Sep. 11, 2014), 2014
WL 4557506, at *4.
98. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *26.
99. Id. at *31 (quoting Strickland and compiling instances of uses of the plural when the
Court is relating errors to prejudice).
100. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *32.
101. See id. (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 112–13 (1976)).
102. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *35 (citing Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641,
648 (2012) (holding that the requirement for an appellant petitioner to request a certificate of
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be remanded to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the circuit court did not
issue a decision on the merits regarding his counsel’s deficient closing
103
argument.
B. Arguments for the State
The State argues that Jennings sought to raise two distinct claims
on appeal, one which the district court accepted, and the other which
104
the court rejected. Jennings was therefore required to cross-appeal
and to file a motion for a certificate of appealability on his claim that
his counsel was ineffective in his closing argument, as both are needed
105
to raise an alternate ground for affirmance. Further, because
AEDPA requires a certificate of appealability to indicate the “specific
issue or issues” that are debatable, Jennings needed a certificate for
each additional issue within his ineffective assistance claim, even if all
106
his allegations of deficient performance were part of the same claim.
The State contends that even if the Court rejects its arguments, the
only relief available to Jennings is a remand for the consideration of
his counsel’s closing argument, an issue that, the State contends, was
107
rejected on the merits.
The State argues that Jennings’s appeal raised a claim rejected by
the district court and requested additional relief from the court’s
108
judgment. The district court’s conditional-release order was based
on trial counsel’s failure to find and present mitigating evidence—
109
errors that constituted deficient performance under Wiggins. The
State maintains that this Wiggins error was distinct from anything
counsel did in his closing argument, and that the closing argument
110
should be judged instead under the standard of Smith v. Spisak,
which only allows relief to be granted when there is a “reasonable
probability” that an improved closing would have made a “significant
111
difference.” Jennings was thus granted the relief of a new trial free
from the Wiggins errors committed by counsel, and was requesting
additional relief by asking the Fifth Circuit to grant him a trial free
appealability is jurisdictional, but “defects” in the certificate process are not)).
103. Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 97, at *20.
104. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *7.
105. Id. at *5–6.
106. Id. at *6.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *7.
109. Id. at *8.
110. 558 U.S. 139, 151 (2010).
111. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *47.
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from Spisak errors.
The State supports this theory with language from Strickland,
contending that because a “convicted defendant making a claim of
ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel
that are alleged not to have been the result of professional judgment,”
that each failure to use “reasonable professional judgment” is the
113
basis for its own ineffectiveness claim. The State also cites Trevino v.
114
Thaler, which held that a petitioner had defaulted on a claim of
ineffective assistance under Wiggins but that he had properly raised a
115
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay.
Because the Trevino Court differentiated the two theories of
ineffectiveness and called each a “claim,” the State asserts that
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot always be a single
116
claim. Viewing the two claims as independent leads not only to the
conclusion that Jennings was requesting additional relief, but also that
he was attempting to change the disposition of a claim, and therefore
must cross-appeal even if he had not been requesting additional
117
relief.
Further, that state contends that even assuming arguendo that
Jennings did not need to cross-appeal, he should still need a certificate
118
of appealability. Requiring a certificate even for a petitioner who is
successful in district court will keep meritless alternate claims from
119
wasting the appellate court’s time. The State identifies this case as a
shining example of a meritless claim being raised on appeal that was
120
rejected by the district court. Section 2253’s use of the phrase
“specific issue or issues” shows a concern not with the appeals of
habeas applicants, but with the issues they raise—it does not matter
who is “taking” the appeal. A certificate of appealability is still
112. Id.
113. Id. at *32.
114. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *33.
115. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1915 (2013).
116. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *33.
117. Id. at *23–25. The State also cites Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 302 U.S. 247 (1937) and
Alexander v. Cosden Pipe Line Co., 290 U.S. 484 (1934) as examples of cases where the
appellee did not seek to change the relief granted but was required to cross-appeal nonetheless
because they sought to change the disposition of an individual claim. In each case, the appellee
argued for a monetary judgment to be upheld on different grounds. The State argues that relief
of multiple claims cannot be more “fungible” than a monetary claim and should therefore be
seen as two claims. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *23–25.
118. Id. at *50.
119. Id. at *42.
120. Id. at *43.
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required for the habeas petitioner if he is arguing issues not
121
supported by the district court’s judgment.
IV. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
This case turns on whether or not Jennings’s counsel’s errors were
part of the same claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, and the
policy rationales for the petitioner’s stance clearly outweigh those
against it. The Court should rule (1) that ineffective assistance of
counsel is a single claim with a deficient performance prong and a
cumulative prejudice prong; and (2) that habeas petitioners who
succeed at the district court level should not be required to crossappeal or obtain a certificate of appealability to raise alternate
arguments for affirmance.
The Court should first answer whether Jennings raised a single
claim or multiple claims in the circuit court. Though the question of
whether or not the prejudice prong of Strickland is cumulative was
not explicitly raised in the question for which the Court granted
122
certiorari, the Court should take this opportunity to decide it, as the
circuits are split on the issue and its resolution will inform the
outcome of this case. As Jennings notes, the Strickland Court
repeatedly used the plural “errors” when describing the prejudice
123
prong of an ineffective assistance claim. It logically follows that the
Court’s decision was based on an attorney making multiple errors
124
together in light of this wording.
Further, this holding would be good policy. Viewing each
deficiency as its own claim allows a court to grant relief on habeas
review only when one single mistake was bad enough to be outcome
125
determinative. If trial counsel committed numerous errors, each just
below that threshold, no relief could be granted. A jury, however,
views the trial as a whole, so though one of these near fatal mistakes
may not have determined the outcome, the combination of several
could have. Viewing ineffective assistance of counsel as a single,
cumulative claim therefore allows courts to apply this outcomedeterminative standard in a way that is more in line with how trials

121. Id. at *46.
122. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at *37.
123. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *31.
124. See McLaughlin, supra note 8, at 880 (“[T]he Court’s repeated use of errors, as a
plural, suggests a broader intent for the ineffective assistance analysis.”).
125. Id. at 881.
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are actually decided.
If the Court finds that prejudice can be cumulated across multiple
deficiencies, it should turn next to whether multiple instances of
deficient performance constitute separate claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Here, the Court should hold that ineffective
assistance is indeed a single claim. The State notes that separate
claims can have “overlapping element[s]” without becoming a single
claim, and argues that even if prejudice is cumulative, ineffective
126
assistance of counsel should still not be viewed as a unitary claim.
But such a stance does not follow logically from the language of
Strickland. Both deficiency and prejudice are required for a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. If multiple deficiencies can be
combined for a single determination of prejudice, then the State’s
suggested reading of ineffective assistance would require combining
the first element from several claims to satisfy the second element for
each of those claims. This concept is confusing and an unnatural
reading of the language. Finding ineffective assistance to be one claim
instead, where the first element can include one or several instances
of deficient performance, is cleaner and adheres more closely to
Strickland’s language.
The State cautions that this holding “would shift the playing field
in the State’s favor” by barring claims of ineffectiveness that were
discovered after the state court proceedings, as most state habeas
127
cases contain an ineffective assistance claim. There are conflicting
128
opinions in the lower courts on what effect this finding would have,
however, and there are options open to the courts to remedy an
inequity arising from a unitary approach to ineffective assistance of
129
counsel.
The remaining issue, whether a petitioner ever needs to file a
cross-appeal or motion for a certificate of appealability after
prevailing in district court, is not as clear-cut. Though here, viewing

126. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *35.
127. Id. at *38 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1395 (2011)).
128. Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 97, at *20 (comparing United States v. Galloway,
56 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel was one claim, but
that raising the claim on direct appeal did not bar the assertion of another ineffectiveness on a
different ground) with Peoples v. United States, 403 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that new
allegations of ineffective assistance on habeas were barred by law-of-the-case doctrine)).
129. Id. (citing Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000) and Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct.
1309 (2012) as cases that would allow a court to entertain “a substantial but procedurally barred
IAC claim upon an adequate showing of ‘cause’ and ‘prejudice’ for the default.”).
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ineffective assistance as a single claim leads to the conclusion that
Jennings did not need to file a cross-appeal or a motion for a
certificate of appealability, Jennings argues that neither is ever needed
130
when the habeas petitioner is the appellee. The Court could offer a
narrow holding, deciding this case only on the argument that
ineffectiveness is one claim and thus a cross-appeal or certificate of
appealability were not required because the Fifth Circuit already had
jurisdiction over that single issue. If the Court takes on this question,
it should rule in favor of habeas petitioners who have already had to
overcome high standards to arrive at this stage of litigation.
Requiring a habeas petitioner who prevailed below to file a crossappeal and a motion for a certificate of appealability would seemingly
eliminate the problem of petitioners throwing any conceivable
argument they could find at the court, thus saving judges time from
131
having to read, consider, and respond to meritless arguments.
However, the Court should still hold that neither a cross-appeal nor a
certificate of appealability is required for a habeas petitioner to argue
alternate grounds of affirmance for his relief. Having already
overcome the extraordinarily high bar of habeas review at the district
court, the petitioners will have meritorious claims to advance. Though
they would also be able to raise meritless arguments on appeal if
there were no requirement for a certificate of appealability,
petitioners at this stage now have something precious to lose, as they
have a judgment in their favor to protect, and thus they will be more
inclined to advance their best arguments.
Finally, though this case presents an opportunity for the Court to
resolve several significant procedural issues in habeas law, it may not
matter for Jennings himself. As the state notes at the close of its brief,
the Fifth Circuit is unlikely to find that his attorney’s closing
argument was deficient performance, and is even less likely to find
132
that it was prejudicial. Even if Jennings wins on the procedural
question presented to the Supreme Court, his petition is ultimately

130. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 18, at *9.
131. Id. at *40 (noting the need to focus attention solely on meritorious claims) (citing
Romans v. Abrams, 790 F.2d 244, 245 (2d Cir. 1986)).
132. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at *49 (noting that the Fifth Circuit
dismissed his motion for a certificate of appealability and thus does not consider the issue
substantial); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support
of Neither Party at 24–25, Jennings v. Stephens, No. 13-7211 (U.S. June 17, 2014), 2014 WL
2902016 (noting that the district court correctly analyzed this point under the “doubly
deferential” Strickland standard).
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unlikely to prevail on the merits. So though his case should bring
increased efficiency to habeas proceedings, Jennings may have only
ended up buying himself extra time, a picture of the very inefficiency
that AEDPA and this case are meant to guard against.
CONCLUSION
In Jennings v. Stephens, the Court has the opportunity to speak to
several issues upon which the federal circuit courts need better
guidance. The Court should seize this opportunity, as these cases
present life or death questions, and unifying the lower courts will
bolster confidence in what are crucial, often mortal, decisions. The
Court should find for Jennings, as his arguments offer the clearest
standards and hew closest to the text of AEDPA and Strickland. And
though ruling for Jennings in this case may not spare him, it will help
future habeas petitioners who have been denied their Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.

